Demography, migration and labour market in Saudi Arabia by DE BEL-AIR, Françoise
Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia
Explanatory Note No. 1/2014
GLMM - EN - No. 1/2014





and Labour Market in  
Saudi Arabia
Françoise De Bel-Air 
Gulf  Labour Markets and Migration
Copyright : © European University Institute (EUI) and Gulf Research Center (GRC), 2013 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, 
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise, without the prior permission of European University Institute and Gulf Research Center.
Disclaimer : The Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) programme cannot be held responsi-
ble in any way for the correctness and accuracy of the information and data published on its website, on 
paper and in other forms, including the database and its publications. The GLMM strongly encourages 
users to verify the correctness and accuracy of the information and data with the source, which is always 
indicated with the greatest accuracy and detail possible. Any opinions expressed in any GLMM publica-
tion are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily state or reflect the opinions or position of the 
Migration Policy Centre, the European University Institute or the Gulf Research Center.
Terms of use : By using any information from Gulf Labour Markets and Migration programme publi-
cations, the user: (a) acknowledges having read the legal notices concerning copyright, terms of use and 
disclaimers and agrees to comply with them in full; (b) agrees to assure himself/herself whether and to 
what extent copyrights exist on information published by the GLMM prior to using this information; 
(c) agrees not to use information published by GLMM in any way that would result in the infringement 
of existing copyrights; (d) agrees to always follow precisely and fully the citation instructions provided 
by the GLMM. GLMM publications may be copied and distributed only in their entirety and together 
with any copyright statements they may contain, as long as they are properly attributed and used for 
non-commercial, educational, or public policy purposes. Photographs, logos, graphs, tables or any other 
images from the GLMM publications may not be used separately.
Support : The Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Programme receives support from the 
International Migration Initiative (IMI) of the Open Society Foundations (OSF) and 
relies on the institutional resources of the GLMM partners.
Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia
Explanatory Note No. 1/2014 3
Abstract: Saudi Arabia is a prime destination and source of remittances from workers for many coun-
tries in Asia and the Arab world. As of mid-2013, expatriates made up 32 percent of the Kingdom’s 
population, most of them coming from South Asia. They accounted for 56.5 percent of the employed 
population and 89 percent of the private sector workforce. Since September 2011, and in spite of a 
spurt in foreign labour recruitment starting in the mid-2000s, a voluntary policy called Nitaqat aims at 
‘Saudising’ the Kingdom’s workforce. The most recent data also show the scale of the irregular migration 
phenomenon in Saudi Arabia: the amnesty campaign which started in April 2013 allowed 4.7 million 
foreign workers to regularise their status, while an ongoing crackdown on illegals forced one million to 
leave the Kingdom in 2013 alone, of which (as of November 30, 2013) 547,000 were deported. 
Keywords: Saudi Arabia; Foreign Population; National Population; Nationals and Foreign Labour; 
Migration Policy; Statistics; Saudisation; Irregularity; Amnesty; Deportation; Citizenship.
Demography, Migration and Labour Market  
in Saudi Arabia
Françoise De Bel-Air
The birthplace of Islam and home to its two holiest shrines, Saudi Arabia has an ideological and political influence over 1.6 billion Muslims, or 23 percent of the world’s population.1 The King-dom is also the biggest economy in the Arab world, endowed with the world’s second largest 
proven oil reserves. This makes Saudi Arabia a major hub for population movements. The pilgrimages to 
the holy sites of Mecca and Medina attract millions of Muslim pilgrims from abroad every year (7.2 mil-
lion in 2012). Also, with an estimated 9.4 million non-national residents in 2012,2 Saudi Arabia ranked 
as the second top remittance-sending country that year3 and was among the top five migrant destination 
countries worldwide. 
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Labour immigration to the Kingdom dates to the late 1930s, as oil exploration picked up spur-
ring inflows of foreign experts and labourers from Western countries and poorer neighbouring Arab 
states. Back then, foreigners shared the labour market with mostly-unskilled Saudi workers; the latter 
organised politically and some labour strikes were launched in the oil fields throughout the 1950s. After 
1973, however, the first oil boom stirred economic diversification and infrastructure-building, resulting 
in much larger flows of skilled and semi-skilled workers into the Kingdom. These migrants, Arabs as well 
as Asians, were recruited on short-term contract basis and were not entitled to social and political rights. 
Moreover, foreign labour flows were used as a means for redistributing oil wealth: in addition to taking 
on career opportunities in the expanding public sector, Saudi citizens could also get an income from 
the trade of labour visas.4 Hence, labour recruitment became disconnected from market needs; pools of 
clandestine migrants grew, unaccounted for by authorities, and could be tapped for short-term business 
needs. For these reasons, until the 2000s, available data on Saudi Arabia’s population were scattered and 
scarce on major aspects.5 
After 1979, political tensions6 underlined the destabilising power of large foreign communities’ set-
tlement in the country. Attempts at controlling the spread of ideologies hostile to oil monarchies (leftist, 
Arab nationalist, and stemming from Islamist movements), followed by the breaking out of the First 
Gulf War in August 1990 after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, sparked increasing mistrust among the 
Gulf regimes towards Arab workers. This led to their gradual replacement by Asian labourers, deemed 
less prone to political claims. 
Moreover, since 1985, dwindling oil revenues combined with the Saudi population’s high demo-
graphic growth (around 3.5 percent annually in 1990, down from above 4 percent in the late 1970s) to 
drastically limit the redistributive capacities of the state. Consequent to Saudi Arabia’s application for 
membership in the WTO, finally achieved in 2005, liberal adjustment policies were also initiated, which 
further threatened the stability of the rentier social contract. Labour-market planning measures started 
taking place in that context.7  Yet, youth unemployment and even poverty became increasingly visible in 
the early 2000s. In 2013, nationals’ unemployment levels stood at 12.2 percent (7.6 percent for the men 
as against 33.4 percent for women) and at 28.4 percent for the 15-29 age group (men: 17.5 percent and 
women: 60.3 percent).8 
Indeed, protests during the 2011 “Arab Spring” focused on unemployment as well as corruption 
and “discriminatory clientelism.”9 King Abdullah countered the protests by announcing a massive $130 
billion subsidy package to fund new housing programmes, raise the minimum wage of public servants 
(mostly Saudis), and create more employment opportunities in the government sector. The ‘Hafiz’ sys-
tem was enacted which provides a SR2,000 allowance to young Saudi job-seekers. A minimum wage 
for the private sector (for nationals only) was set at SR3,000 ($800) to persuade Saudis to venture into 
the sector. Yet, to address the very pressing need for massive job creation in the private sector for Saudi 
youths, the government had to regain the upper hand in economic decision-making. It thus engaged in 
two voluntary sets of labour market reforms:
- The Nitaqat campaign for the Saudisation of the workforce was launched in September 2011. 
Though the issue of indigenisation of the workforce has been periodically revived since the 1990s,10 it 
has been fiercely opposed by the business community, which claims that Saudi workers are costly, hard 
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Stock
Drawing a picture of Saudis residing abroad is a dif-
ficult task, as Saudi statistics do not keep a record of 
expatriate nationals, except for students. Neighbouring 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do 
not publish data on foreign residents disaggregated by 
country of citizenship or country of birth. 
However, press articles and direct observation point 
to the settlement of Saudis, mostly highly-skilled pro-
fessionals, in other GCC states. For example, rising 
numbers of young Saudi graduates were reported to be 
seeking employment opportunities in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) in the late 2000s. Numerous Saudi 
businesspeople, men and women, also operate from 
Bahrain or Dubai, where they can escape the Kingdom’s 
slow bureaucratic pace, as well as the social obstacles 
faced by most female decision-makers in Saudi Arabia. 
At the end of 2012, 4,255 Saudi workers were registered 
by social security networks in other GCC countries 
Stock
In mid-2013, the number of non-Saudis stood at 
9,723,214 persons, or 32.4 percent of the total resident 
population of 29,994,272.17 Saudi Arabia’s total and 
Saudi populations are among the fastest growing in the 
world: they both approximately doubled in the last two 
decades.
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to lay off, and unwilling to engage in low-skilled tasks, while lacking the skills, training and, above all, 
labour productivity demanded by the private sector. Nitaqat combines incentives that encourage firms 
to hire Saudis and sanctions for non-compliant ones. Based on quotas for Saudi employees in relation 
to industry and the size of companies, the system classifies them by colour (red, yellow, green and pre-
mium). Those falling within the green and premium category are provided certain services, incentives 
and facilities by the Labour Ministry. Companies falling within the yellow and red zones that do not 
meet the Saudisation quotas are deprived of services, such as renewing the work permits of their expatri-
ate workers. A fee of SR2,400 ($640) per redundant expatriate is also imposed. However, whether this 
programme will lead to replacement of foreign labourers by Saudis or add newly-recruited Saudis to 
migrant workers by large-scale job creation still remains to be seen.
- A multi-dimensional campaign against workers and residents in irregular situation has been un-
derway since April 3, 2013. Saudi Arabia has attempted to limit the presence of illegal residents even 
earlier. It tried to control entries from Yemen11 by resuming the construction of a 1,800 km iron fence 
along the border with its neighbour. Over the 2000s and 2010s, periods of amnesty alternated with 
crackdown operations against illegals. However, the current campaign is of a much wider scope and scale. 
As of November 3, 2013, about five million expatriates in irregular situation have been regularised and 
one million are said to have left or been deported. Some sources12 claim that another million deporta-
tions is set as a target for the coming months. It remains to be seen how many of those workers may 
come back yet as legal, state-sanctioned foreign residents.
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(1,792 were under the Saudi General Organization for 
Social Insurance [GOSI] and 2,463 were under other 
GCC states’ social security coverage).13 
A few thousand Saudi nationals are also reported to be 
residing in poorer Arab and Asian countries. In many 
cases, these are offspring of Saudi fathers and local 
mothers, as rising costs of marriage in all GCC coun-
tries increasingly compel middle-class Saudi men to 
seek “cheaper” wives abroad. 
In the OECD countries, Saudi-born and Saudi nation-
als are estimated to number around 100,000. Over half 
of them reside in the US and have been naturalised in 
their country of residence.
 However, receiving countries’ data do not match with 
available Saudi records. Indeed, Saudi students abroad 
alone are reported to number 174,645 for the academic 
year 2011-2012, from a low of 12,800 in 2002-2003 fol-
lowing the September 11 attacks. They are distributed 
as follows: 
Saudi students, and among them a vast majority of men, 
thus account for the bulk of Saudis abroad. Their num-
ber has grown since the mid-2000s, firstly due to heavy 
investments in education which quadrupled enrolment 
in tertiary education since 2000 and secondly, due to 
several study abroad schemes, such as the King Ab-
dullah Scholarship Programme. This programme aims 
at encouraging young Saudis to acquire world-class 
academic training in scientific and related specialities 
(medicine, engineering, law, accounting, and marketing, 
In January 2013, before the beginning of the correction 
campaign, 6,026,583 non-nationals were economically 
active, of which 6,003,616 were employed (56.5 per-
cent of the total employed population).18 Half of the 
employed Saudis (52.1 percent) were enrolled in the 
government sector in 2011, down from 69.3 percent 
in 2009. By contrast, non-nationals were concentrated 
in the private sector (99 percent of the employed for-
eign population) in 2011.19 Foreign labourers made up 
89.1 percent of the private sector’s manpower that year, 
above the GCC countries’ average of 85 percent.
Like elsewhere in the region, as of 2013 the profile of 
the foreign population is that of a predominantly male 
(287 men for 100 women) and little educated popula-
tion (62.3 percent of employed non-nationals are be-
low secondary level education). Last available figures 
(2007)20 also pointed at its demographic distortion: 
those in working-age groups (15 to 64 years) were over-
represented and formed 79 percent of the non-nationals 
as a whole. 
In 2013, the bulk of foreign labourers were working in 
the construction sector (26.5 percent) and in the retail 
and wholesale (22.3 percent) and the private house-
holds sectors (15 percent). The health and education 
sectors employ, respectively, 3.6 and 2.6 percent of non-
Saudi workers. As regards their occupational distribu-
tion, as expected most are confined to the lowest, “blue 
collar” categories (‘engineering support’ and ‘services’: 
59.1 percent). However, non-nationals also constitute 
52 percent of the ‘managers’ and ‘specialists’, the two 
highest categories of occupation.21  
Saudi authorities conceal data pertaining to the nation-
ality breakdown of foreign residents in official publi-
cations, for fear that the numeric domination of some 
nationalities would encourage socio-political claims. 
However, the World Bank estimated the top three re-
mittance beneficiaries from Saudi Arabia in 2012 were: 
India ($8.4 billion), Egypt ($5.7 billion), and Pakistan 
($3 billion). It is thus likely that these nationalities are 
among the most represented in the Kingdom’s foreign 
workforce.
This is confirmed by estimates released in the press by 
Saudi government officials22 during the 2013 cam-
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for instance) in overseas universities, so as to upgrade 
the skill level of future Saudi manpower in line with in-
ternational standards. The programme started with the 
US and was later expanded to other countries. This pro-
gramme and other incentive schemes provide generous 
financial support to Saudi students, as well as to spouses 
or family members accompanying them. In 2011-2012, 
142,628 students abroad had scholarships and 32,017 
were enrolled at their own expense. Expatriate Saudi 
students constituted 15 percent of all national students 
that year.
Flows
Cross-border movements of Saudi nationals are not ac-
counted for in the Kingdom’s statistics of entries and 
exits. However, incoming and exiting foreigners are 
recorded by country of citizenship. Though probably 
marked by a degree of inaccuracy and under-registra-
tion of events, these records are the only source available 
to draw broad estimates of the nationality distribution 
of migrant flows to and from Saudi Arabia. 
paigns targeting illegals in the Kingdom. Indian nation-
als dominate with their estimated number reaching 2.8 
million, of which 1.6 million are workers.23  
 As compared to the official figure of 9.7 million non-
nationals in mid-2013 – if accurate – such data would 
demonstrate the scale of the illegal migration phenom-
enon in the Kingdom. As a matter of fact, in December 
2012 (i.e., before the start of regularisation campaigns) 
Saudi authorities were claiming that up to 5 million 
immigrants were residing and working illegally in the 
country,24 among whom were foreign pilgrims having 
overstayed their Haj and Umrah visas as well as those 
who had entered illegally, especially through Yemen.
Cutting across irregular and regular migrants’ issues lies 
another question crucial to Saudi Arabia’s demographic 
future: that of the second- and even third- generation 
expats born in the Kingdom to foreign and to Saudi 
mothers. They are considered foreigners even if they 
have spent all their life in Saudi Arabia and foster no 
ties with their country of citizenship (if any, in the case 
of Palestinians, for instance). While there is no data to 
precisely evaluate their number, estimates range from 
1 to 2 million. The figure of 30,000 third-generation 
Saudi-born Indians living in the Kingdom was also cir-
culated in the press in 2013.25  
OUTWARD MIGRATION INWARD MIGRATION
Françoise De Bel-Air 
Gulf  Labour Markets and Migration8
The shift in recruitment policies towards favouring 
Asian labourers over Arabs in the late 1980s appears 
clearly on the graph and so does the post-Gulf War I 
deep economic downturn, which led to a general re-
verse of migration flows. Since the late 1990s the Arabs’ 
net migration flows to the Kingdom seem first to have 
stalled, before increasing after 2005. The outbreak of the 
2007-2008 world financial crisis did not seem to spur a 
massive exodus back to sending countries as was feared. 
Political events also greatly affected population move-
ments across the Kingdom’s borders.
Flows
In the context of Saudisation and irregular residency 
correction campaigns, many advocate a massive natu-
ralisation of Saudi-born aliens and children of Saudi 
mothers. Beyond considerations of social justice, such a 
move would effectively help the private sector reach its 
Saudisation quotas.
Naturalisations have indeed been performed in the past. 
Available data, however, show that it benefitted small 
numbers.26  
Naturalised aliens were most often Arabs (80 percent 
and more), with a vast majority among them being 
Yemenis, Egyptians and Syrians. Moreover, after the 
late 1980s, naturalisations were increasingly confined 
to females. This suggests that most beneficiaries were 
spouses of Saudi men. 
Indeed, so far the right of blood (jus sanguinis) and 
marital ties still exclusively prevails, over birth on Saudi 
territory (jus soli). Most recent amendments to resi-
dency rules are, again, circumscribed to the sponsorship 
issue and only concern Saudi citizens’ foreign family 
members. In early 2013, Saudi women married to non-
nationals earned the right to sponsor their children for 
residency, as well as for work in the private sector; they 
can also sponsor their foreign husband for the latter. 
In addition, since September 2013 non-Saudi mothers 
of Saudi children are allowed permanent residence in 
Saudi Arabia without sponsor, with access to education 
and health services.
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In the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, some 800,000 Yemenis (of whom, a half had been 
living in Saudi Arabia for twenty years and more, and 
up to 20 percent was born there) fled the Kingdom in a 
mass exodus. Newly unified Yemen was accused to have 
sided with the pro-Iraqi camp, as tensions were already 
mounting between the two countries over border dis-
putes and other issues.
In that context, Saudi authorities decided to enforce 
policy reforms passed before the war. These stripped 
Yemenis from privileges they had enjoyed so far, unlike 
any other foreign nationals: the right to set up compa-
nies in Saudi Arabia with no Saudi majority ownership 
and the right to work without obligation to obtain work 
permits and local sponsors (Van Hear, 1998: 86-93). 
Moreover, some Yemenis lost the Saudi passports they 
had earned before and hence fell into the ranks of the 
Bidun (stateless population) of Saudi Arabia. 14  
In stark contrast to the Yemenis, the graph points to the 
sizeable inflow of Egyptians during the period 1990-
1993. As a matter of fact, Egypt was part of the allied 
coalition against the Iraqi regime during Gulf War I. 
Diplomatic crises also entailed shifts in migration flows. 
As international concern was growing over wide-scale 
mistreatment of Asian domestic workers in Saudi Ara-
bia, the execution of an Indonesian woman spurred a 
diplomatic crisis between the two countries; Indonesia 
banned workers from going to the Kingdom in August 
2011. That same year, claims from the Philippines de-
manding better guarantees and protection for Filipina 
domestic employees similarly disrupted diplomatic re-
lations between the two countries. The chart actually 
emphasizes the partial reversal of the Indonesians and 
Filipinos’ rate of migration to Saudi Arabia after 2010. 
However, the most massive population displacement 
across Saudi borders in the country’s history may well 
result from the ongoing (as of December 2013) major 
operation against all undocumented and irregular work-
ers and residents, supervised by the Ministry of Labour 
and Ministry of Interior. The campaign targets foreign-
In 2004, the Government amended the Naturalisation 
Law to permit some long-term residents (10 years of 
continuous residency) to apply for citizenship, with 
priority given to those with degrees in certain scientific 
fields. No data exists so far to assess how many highly-
skilled professionals subsequently used this option to 
settle in Saudi Arabia.
Actually, if one observes the flows of foreign workers 
joining the Saudi labour market since the mid-2000s, 
there are no clear signs of a significant upgrading of 
the workforce’s qualifications. Workers in skilled and 
highly-skilled categories (ranging from clerical workers 
to managers) make up 11 to 12.8 percent of all labour 
permit holders over the period.
By contrast, however, absolute figures show that the 
number of labour permits granted more than doubled 
between 2005 and 2011. During the six years, almost 
2.5 million jobs were created, to the benefit of foreign 
labourers.
This upward trend continued in 2012: until that year, 
the Labour Ministry also gave a green light to rising 
numbers of work visas27 in all sectors, including the 
government sector. 
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ers with no residency or work permits, those working 
for an employer other than their sponsor, and those 
operating in a trade other than that described on their 
iqama (residency permit). 
From April 3 to November 3, 2013, the amnesty al-
lowed an estimated 4.7 million foreign workers to cor-
rect their status. It also led to the final exit of about 
one million more. Some were deported (among them 
at least 200,000 Yemenis); others were either unwilling 
or unable to sort out their situation, or were made re-
dundant under newly-defined quotas for non-nationals’ 
participation in different sectors. In addition, an un-
known number of irregular migrants remain stranded 
without valid personal documents and are thus pre-
vented from either starting the correction procedure or 
leaving the country. The scale of the campaign largely 
overwhelmed the capacities of diplomatic missions and 
pointed at sending countries’ limited efficiency for serv-
ing their nationals abroad.
Since the expiry of the amnesty period on November 
4, large-scale systematic raids on labour sites by the 
Ministry of Labour as well as massive rounding up op-
erations by the police in areas inhabited by foreigners 
are being conducted. As of mid-December 2013, the 
Interior Ministry stated that 208,000 more deporta-
tions had taken place since the amnesty period expired 
(137,500 for November 2013 alone), largely up from al-
ready high figures of monthly deportations for the two 
previous years. 15 
Stateless persons (Biduns and Palestinians, for instance) 
as well as citizens from some war-torn countries (Syr-
ians, Burmese) are exempted from deportation.
All nationalities are not affected in an even manner: 
Fewer Indian workers, for example, left the Kingdom 
during these events (140,000) as compared to 300,000 
Egyptians and 200,000 Yemenis. The number of Ethio-
pian deportees had reached 140,000 since the beginning 
of the crackdown, with 35,000 more being expected by 
local authorities, according to IOM. 16  
Such patterns of workers’ inflows seem to be in opposi-
tion to measures taken to combat nationals’ unemploy-
ment. However, this can be explained, first, by the en-
hancement of the private sector’s share in the economy 
and the need to attract more FDI after Saudi Arabia 
became a member of WTO in 2005: the process gave 
an impetus to easing the entry and activities of foreign 
investors and workers. Second, relying on the upsurge in 
oil prices, the Kingdom undertook massive infrastruc-
tural projects in the mid-2000s, which further expand-
ed following the “Arab Spring.” Housing projects, for 
instance, require the hiring of vast numbers of foreign 
workers, as unemployed Saudis do not yet venture in 
significant numbers into that sector.   
Expectedly, the number of residency permits granted by 
the Saudi Interior Ministry also went up, nearly dou-
bling in ten years, from 765,903 in 2000 to 1,411,688 
in 2011. After 2005, the share of ‘dependents’ increased 
notably among permit holders as a whole. Knowing that 
in Saudi Arabia, only managerial-level professionals can 
apply for a permanent family visa, this confirms that 
highly-skilled non-Saudis also benefited from the hike 
in labour import after 2005.
OUTWARD MIGRATION INWARD MIGRATION
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Saudi Arabia being the first source of remittances for 
many Arab and Asian countries, such deportations may 
have significant economic consequences on their frag-
ile economies. For example, the forced exit of Yemenis, 
expected to reach about 400,000 according to IOM, 
may deprive local families of most of the 2 billion yearly 
income in remittances, thus sharply deepening poverty 
levels in that politically unstable and economically-rav-
aged country.  
Regarding future flows of foreign labourers to the King-
dom, it remains to be seen which way the current raids 
against illegals will restructure the Saudi labour mar-
ket. As mentioned earlier, not many Indian workers, for 
example, left the Kingdom during the correction cam-
paign, in comparison to other nationalities. Moreover, 
on November 10, in the midst of the crackdowns, an 
agreement was inked between the governments of In-
dia and Saudi Arabia, which aimed at “streamlining the 
recruitment process” and “curtailing the role of middle-
men”28 to protect Indians workers on their way to the 
Kingdom.
Therefore, one important outcome of the Saudi crack-
down may be the instatement of the Saudi government 
as the major actor in the migration process. Moreover, 
the deportation campaigns may not reduce the number 
of foreign workers, as much as it may change the na-
tionality and skills profile of future flows of foreigners 
to the Kingdom. 
OUTWARD MIGRATION INWARD MIGRATION
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census figures.
18. Population aged 15 and more. Labour Force Survey 2013 (Round 1), CDSI, January 2013, http://gulfmigration.eu/em-
ployed-population-by-citizenship-saudi-non-saudi-1999-2012/ 
19. Respectively, Ministry of Civil Service and Ministry of Labour; see SAMA Annual Report, no. 48 (2013). In Saudi Arabia, 










and-hard-place quoted a figure of “over 2 million” Saudi-born foreign residents, stemming from CDSI.
26. They never accounted for more than 0.03 percent of the rates of population increase over the years. No data on naturalisa-
tions is published after 1420H (1999-2000AD).
27. The labour visa allows the worker to enter Saudi Arabia. It is issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after acceptance of 
the worker’s application file by the Ministry of Labour, upon request from his/her prospective sponsor. The work visas are 
more than the actual workers present in the country, as some eventually do not complete the procedure, or are rejected at 
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